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Over the last forty years, government social welfare pro-
grams have taken on increasingly important roles in advanced
industrial nations. In countries of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), rising social
expenditures are largely responsible for the almost 60% increase
in the percentage of GDP to government spending between
1960 and 1998, from 27.3% of GDP to 44.3%. For the United
States alone, the percentages rose from 28.4% in 1960 to 32.8%
in 1998.1
Social welfare expenditures are sure to climb in response to
various demographic changes and technological advances.
Aging populations and increasing family breakdown, for exam-
ple, will require higher levels of public support. And new medi-
cal procedures as well as longer life spans will raise medical costs,
while the demand for a more highly skilled workforce will raise
post-secondary education costs.
Around the world, however, there is growing unease about
the quality of government-supported social welfare programs.
Too often, government programs seem ineffectual and unre-
sponsive to the needs of their clients, even as program costs and
total spending spiral. Various administrative procedures and reg-
ulations have been imposed in an attempt to correct such
problems, but results have been uneven, at best.
This paper argues that many (but certainly not all) govern-
ment social welfare programs would improve if market-based sys-
tems were used to put "purchasing power" directly in the hands
of consumers, that is, clients. Such systems are "bottom-up" as
opposed to "top-down" in operation. This paper also outlines
the situations in which particular, "bottom-up" market mecha-
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1. J. CONG. ECON. COMM., 106TH CONG., REP. OF THE J CONG. ECON.
COMM. OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 1999 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT
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nisms-lower taxes, cash assistance, reimbursed fee-for-service
regimes, or vouchers-are programmatically more appropriate.
However, this paper purposely avoids specific programmatic
prescriptions. A wise policy in one program area might be fool-
hardy in another. An approach that might work in one country,
state, or community might be catastrophic in another. Instead,
this paper presents the general factors that should be considered
in deciding whether to create or encourage a market for a partic-
ular social welfare service.
I. "Top-DowN" vs. "BoTroM-UP" DECISION MAKING
Governments provide social welfare services either (1)
directly, through government owned and operated agencies, or
(2) indirectly, through grants and contracts with nonprofit agen-
cies, for-profit firms, or other institutions of society. In almost all
countries, old-age pensions, cash welfare, and educational ser-
vices (at least at the primary and secondary level) are provided
directly. The picture is more mixed for other program areas,
such as medical services, higher education, child care, and social
counseling. Most European countries provide the bulk of these




* Cash assistance (income support, unemployment insurance, disability






" Education (elementary, secondary, and post-secondary)
* Job training
* Social, counseling, and rehabilitation services
In many countries, growing unhappiness with government-
provided social welfare services (as opposed to income-support
and old-age pension programs) has led to increased interest in
using non-governmental agencies to provide various services.
(See Box 1) Often called "privatization," this movement has
been aided by a general belief that non-governmental entities
provide higher quality services at lower costs than do government
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agencies.2 Moreover, many non-governmental providers are
housed in key institutions of civil society, or "mediating struc-
tures,"3 such as churches and voluntary associations, which are
seen as more effective because of their moral authority and their
ability to leverage other forces in the family and community.4
The United States probably uses non-governmental service
providers more than any other nation. The planners of Lyndon
Johnson's "Great Society" in the 1960s deliberately chose to
engage the private sector in their programs in order to build
political support.5 Billions of dollars became available for grants
or contracts to non-governmental agencies. As a result, the last
thirty years have witnessed an explosion of government-sup-
ported, private agency-provided social welfare services.6 This
approach has so permeated social welfare services in the United
States that it even has a name: "third-party government. "'
For example, in 1989, in the United States, nonprofit agen-
cies that provided health services, education, social, and legal ser-
vices, or that promoted art and culture, had combined revenues
of approximately $476 billion, according to Lester Salamon, of
the Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies, in one of the few
comprehensive studies on the financing of private social welfare
services.' (Note- All dollar figures in this paper have been
adjusted for inflation, and are in 2000 dollars.) Fully 32% of this
total, over $153 billion, was provided by the government,
2. "By using nonprofit agencies government policy makers hoped to
administer their programs with more skill, creativity, flexibility," writes Leslie
Lenkowsky, former head of the Hudson Institute in America. Leslie Lenkow-
sky, Philanthropy and the Welfare State, in PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEU-
HAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 88 (2d ed. 1996). See
generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992).
3. Mediating structures, as defined by Berger and Neuhaus, are "those
institutions that stand between the private world of individuals and the large,
impersonal structures of modern society. They 'mediat[e]' by constituting a
vehicle by which personal beliefs and values [can] be transmitted into the
mega-institutions." BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 148.
4. See id. However, this is an easily exaggerated argument, since many of
these agencies have little real connection to their host mediating institution.
5. For a general discussion of this element of the Great Society, see NEIL
GILBERT, CAPITALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL BENE'VO-
LENCE 7 (1983); see generally Lenkowsky, supra note 2.
6. "For example, government purchase of service contracting with non-
profit service agencies in Massachusetts rose from $25 million in 1971 to $850
million in 1988." STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR
HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 6 (1993).
7. See Lester M. Salamon, Rethinking Public Management: Third-Party Govern-
ment and the Changing Forms of Government Action, 29 PUB. POL'V 255-75 (1981).
8. Lester M. Salamon, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 26 (1996).
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through grants, contracts, and other forms of reimbursement.
(Fees and service charges accounted for 51% of total revenues,
and private giving contributed 18%.)' Different types of agen-
cies received different proportions of their funding from these
sources: Health agencies, for example, received 55% from fees,
36% from government, and 9% from private giving; education
agencies received 63% from fees, 17% from government, and
19% from private giving; and social service agencies received
23% from fees, 42% from government, and 35% from private
giving.
In their aptly titled book, Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State
in the Age of Contracting, Steven Smith, of the University of Wash-
ington's Evans School of Public Affairs, and Michael Lipsky, of
the Ford Foundation, describe how government in the United
States "relies on nonprofits to provide social services":
In fiscal year 1989, 14 Massachusetts state agencies spent
over $800 million, about 8.5% of the state budget, to
purchase from over 1,150 contractors such services as alco-
holism rehabilitation, family crisis intervention, instruction
in English-as-a-second language, and daycare. Overall, the
state recognizes over 200 distinct types of social services in
its purchase-of-service system. In New York City, several
municipal agencies do not deliver direct services at all but
wholly depend on purchase-of-service agreements with
nonprofit agencies. These include the Youth Bureau, the
Department of Employment, the Community Develop-
ment Agency, the Department of Mental Health, Mental
Retardation, and Alcoholism Services, and the Agency for
Child Development (daycare and Head Start). The total
amount of money disbursed in contracts in fiscal year 1985
was over one billion dollars.'
Alas, government utilization of private, nonprofit agencies,
and for-profit firms has not proven to be the remedy for inade-
quate and unresponsive social welfare services. Many of these
agencies end up looking-and behaving-very much like the
government agencies for which they substitute.
In response have come calls for using a more competitive
process in the funding of contracts and grants' '-propelled in
9. Id.
10. SMITH & LIPSKY, supra note 6, at 4.
11. See generally OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 3; see also P. Nelson Reid,
Reforming the Social Services Monopoly, Soc. WORK, Nov. 17, 1972; Robert Pruger &
Leonard Miller, Competition and the Public Social Services, PUB. WELFARE, Fall 1973;
John Goodman, Privatizing the Welfare State, in PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZATION
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part by the fall of the Soviet Union and the disenchantment with
command economies that it spurred. Whether it is a car or a
college education, most people now believe that competition,
more than anything else, promotes quality and lowers costs.
As a result, many countries are experimenting with competi-
tion in various program areas. Non-governmental entities are
invited to bid on contracts or apply for grants to provide various
services in an effort to instill greater efficiency and innovation in
the provision of services. (Sometimes, government agencies are
also allowed to bid, on the theory that this will improve their cost-
effectiveness as well.) 
12
In many situations, competitive contracting encourages
greater programmatic innovation and responsiveness, as well as
putting a damper on prices. But much of this competition has
been for government grants and contracts, which is really just
another form of "top-down" decision making. In this paper, I
argue that such "top-down" decision making is inherently less
reliable than "bottom-up" approaches, and it threatens the inde-
pendence of private agencies, including those sponsored by the
mediating structures of civil society. Let me explain.
A. "Top-Down" Decision Making
In "top-down" decision making, money is transferred from
the government (or other source, such as a private foundation)
to a public or private agency that, in turn, provides services to
clients. (In federal systems, the money may move from the fed-
eral government to a state or local government and thence to
service providers.) "Bottom-up" funding, on the other hand, is
recipient-directed. Using government provided cash, vouchers,
or similar instruments, individual recipients (or sometimes com-
munities) determine which agencies or firms get funded through
their cumulative decisions of which to use (or, in the case of
communities, which they endorse).
In top-down funding, then, the government chooses the ser-
vice provider that will aid recipients; in bottom-up funding, the
recipients themselves choose their service provider. These two
concepts, and their advantages and disadvantages, are widely dis-
(Steve Hanke ed., 1987); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER Gov-
ERNMENT (1987); DAVID LINOWES, PRIVATIZATION: TowARD MORE EirEcrrvE Gov-
ERNMENT (1988); but see Paul Starr, The Limits of Privatization, in PROSPECTS FOR
PRIVATIZATION (Steve Hanke ed., 1987).
12. For examples of government agencies bidding on contracts, see
OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 2, at 88-89.
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cussed in the academic literature concerning the "implementa-
tion" of social programs. 13
Cash assistance programs-such as income support, unem-
ployment insurance, disability payments, and old-age pensions-
are by definition bottom-up since the funds are given directly to
individuals. But most developed countries usually fund other
social welfare programs (excluding cash assistance) top-down.
For example, government housing and education programs (at
least at the elementary and secondary levels) are almost always
top-down programs. Health care, child care, and higher educa-
tion programs tend to be more mixed, partly because they are
often built on earlier, private-sector models."
Top-down funding, and especially large, government-oper-
ated bureaucracies, have a long, and often successful history. In
the United States, for example, many government-operated sys-
tems-the post office and public schools-were widely viewed as
successful. What has changed?
There are many explanations for what appears to be an
international breakdown in at least some forms of bureaucratic
government. The growing complexity of social and management
problems, the growth of unions and the inflexible work rules
they often secure, the increase in non-governmental employment
opportunities that draw away the most skilled workers, and so
forth have all contributed to the apparent decline in the effec-
tiveness of government-provided services. But above all these fac-
tors, one stands out: the rapidity of change and the consequent
ongoing need for prompt operational responsiveness.
Bureaucracies work best, writes Warren Bennis, of the Uni-
versity of Southern California's Marshall School of Business, "in a
highly competitive, undifferentiated, and stable environment,
such as the climate of its youth, the Industrial Revolution. A
pyramidal structure of authority, with power concentrated in the
hands of few with the knowledge and resources to control an
enterprise was, and is, an eminently suitable arrangement for
routinized tasks." However, Bennis continues:
The environment has changed in just those ways which
make the mechanism most problematical. Stability has
vanished .... One factor accelerating change is the growth
of science, research and development activities, and intel-
13. See, e.g., Paul Sabatier, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approach to Implementa-
tion Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y 21-48
(1986); Dennis Palumbo, Symposium: Implementation, What We Have Learned and
Still Need to Know, 7 POL'Y STUD. REV. ANN. 91-102 (1987).
14. See generally GILBERT, supra note 5.
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lectual technology. Another is the increase of transactions
with social institutions and the importance of the latter in
conducting the enterprise-including government, distrib-
utors and consumers, shareholders, competitors, raw mate-
rial and power suppliers, sources of employees
(particularly managers), trade unions, and groups within
the firms. There is, as well, more interdependence
between the economic and other facets of society, resulting
in complications of legislation and public regulation.
Thirdly, and significantly, competition between firms
diminishes as their fates intertwine and become positively
correlated.1 5
Top-down programs are at a disadvantage in this environ-
ment because they do not change quickly-or easily. "The orga-
nizations that thrive today," writes Bennis, "are those that
embrace change instead of trying to resist it. The old Weberian
bureaucracies are simply too slow, too weighed down with inter-
organizational agendas and priorities, to compete in a world
where success goes to those who can identify and solve problems
almost before they have names." 6
Turning to competitive bidding for grants and contracts was
an attempt to create this kind of flexible responsiveness-and to
lower costs. Unfortunately, even when funding decisions are
based on competitive bids and proposals, government is likely to
fund the wrong agencies and services. A major reason is that the
operative decision makers are not the actual recipients of the ser-
vices, creating a disharmony of interests between the two. Even
when top-down decision makers try to reflect the interests of
recipients, they have limited tools for identifying those interests
and weighing them against other considerations.
Competitive bidding can help, but only when decisions can
be based on easily measured and relatively reliable outcome mea-
sures. But such outcome measures are rare for social welfare ser-
vices. A government official might be able to gauge whether
trash was being collected properly, but measuring the quality of
social work counseling is much more subjective. Even medical
care is not subject to simple cost-effective measurement. Hence,
top-down funding of social welfare services tends to fall victim to
the vagaries of misplaced priorities, bureaucratic convenience,
personal favoritism, and political calculation. Thus, for example,
according to Louis Winnick of the Fund for the City of New York:
15. WARREN BENNIS, BEYOND BuREAucRAcy: ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT
AND EVOLUTION OF HUMAN ORGANIZATION 10-11 (1993).
16. Id. at xii.
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A 1993 city performance review of New York city job-train-
ing programs gave an unsatisfactory rating to 25 contrac-
tors, 22 of which had their contracts renewed. In a report
highly critical of New York's social service contracting poli-
cies, Constance Cushman, the Executive Director of New
York's Procurement Policy Board, comments on this prac-
tice: "Vendor screening is politicized as never before....
We pay dearly for this system in administrative costs, higher
prices, and decreased competition, yet still do not succeed
in screening out corruption, much less foster quality. A
free market is the best safeguard from corruption, and we
preclude its existence."'
7
To be blunt, top-down decision making in the provision of
social welfare services is analogous to establishing an industrial
policy: Instead of trying to pick the best manufacturer, for exam-
ple, government tries to pick the best service provider.
Worse, once government funding begins, political pressures
make it almost impossible to end support (and rechannel funds
toward more promising approaches). Allan Meltzer of Carnegie
Mellon University documented this effect in regard to govern-
ment provided seed money for start-up companies. He found
that non-government decision makers were more successful at
picking "winners" because they were more likely to abandon an
obviously unsuccessful project than was the government. In
other words, government has difficulty performing the key task
of good decision making: creating "losers." As Meltzer explains:
Why, in general, is government less efficient? Someone had
to decide to make additional investments in companies that
appear to have good prospects, thereby putting more money at
risk, or to shut down companies that no longer appear promis-
ing. Government is more likely to delay closing the failures and
more likely to pump additional money to try to cover mistakes or
misjudgments."
In the United States, many Head Start providers, for exam-
ple, were originally chosen almost three decades ago for political
reasons having little to do with their ability to care for children-
17. Louis Winnick, Privatizing Social Services: Are Vouchers a Pathway?
10 (Mar. 1995) (unpublished paper, on file with The Fund for the City of New
York), quoted in John Hall & William D. Eggers, Health and Social Services in the
Post-Welfare State: Are Vouchers the Answer?, 192 PRWATIZATION CENTER POL'Y
STUD. 3 (1995).
18. Allan H. Meltzer, Why Governments Make Bad Venture Capitalists, WALL
ST. J., May 5, 1993, at A22.
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and many continued to be funded even though they were pale
reflections of their former selves.' 9
B. "Bottom-Up," Recipient-Directed Funding
These problems with bureaucratically managed, top-down
regimes make recipient-directed, bottom-up approaches attrac-
tive to many observers. As Stuart Butler of the Heritage Founda-
tion writes in To Empower People, "Don't decide-let the people
decide for you."20
If there were a true marketplace of social welfare programs,
particular agencies and services would be funded only because
recipients chose to use them. As David Osborne and Ted
Gaebler point out in their influential book, Reinventing Govern-
ment, "The single best way to make public service providers
respond to the needs of their customers is to put resources in the
customers' hands and let them choose. Putting resources
directly in customers' hands may at first sound like a radical idea,
but it is not."21
"Customer-driven systems force service providers to be
accountable to their customers," argue Osborne and Gaebler.22
Under such systems, service providers must win the patronage
(in both senses of the word) of the clients they are meant to
serve. And, the defunding of apparently unsuccessful services or
programs is easier because, in theory at least, recipients will sim-
ply stop selecting them.23 In customer- or recipient-directed
systems:
If service quality declines or price increases, the recipient
will look to other providers for a better deal. Like any
other consumer, the voucher recipient will perform this
monitoring function automatically. The competitive incen-
tive for providers to discover low-cost ways of delivering a
service is a form of market-induced monitoring. Each pro-
19. See Letter from Edward Zigler, former head of the Head Start Pro-
gram, to Douglas J. Besharov (Apr. 27, 1998) (on file with author). "30% of
Head Start centers were of such poor quality that they had to be upgraded to be
effective in improving the growth trajectory of those children involved." Id.
20. Stuart M. Butler, Practical Principles, in BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note
3, at 118.
21. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 2, at 180-81.
22. Id. at 181.
23. Even if government initially picked allowable providers, it could drop
them based on the actual selections of clients: A rule could be established that a
minimum number of clients must select that particular service provider over a
designated period of time; otherwise, the provider is automatically dropped
from the list.
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ducer, in seeking to increase profits, will act as a monitor
of the other producers' performance. Producers that can-
not or will not keep costs down and quality high will be
driven from the market.
24
All things being equal, the cumulative decisions of
thousands, or millions, of recipients are simply more likely to be
correct than are top-down decisions by a small number of gov-
ernment or foundation officials, and they will drive up the aver-
age quality of services provided. Although some recipients might
select inferior services,2 5 on average they should do better than
government because they are in a superior position to determine
what they need, and because their individual decisions are less
likely to be determined by such extraneous factors as political
favoritism.
In theory, at least, market-oriented approaches should also
raise the average quality of services-because they "require orga-
nizations to 'market' themselves directly to those who will be
served rather than to those who ultimately provide the financial
support (typically government). "26 Thus, for example, propo-
nents of educational vouchers argue that they will encourage
schools to develop innovative programs, recruit better teachers,
or do both. 27 Here is how John Chubb and Terry Moe, when
they were of the Brookings Institution, described the market
dynamic:
While schools controlled only by the market are free to
organize any way they want, then, an environment of com-
petition and choice gives them strong incentives to move
24. Hall & Eggers, supra note 17, at 4 n.14.
25. David Stoesz, Social Service Vouchers: Bringing Choice and Competition to
Social Services, PROGRESSIVE POL'v INST. POL'Y REP. 1, 7 n.16 (1992).
The federal student loan guarantee program, for example, had suf-
fered from trade schools and other institutions that provide benefi-
ciaries of loan guarantees with little or no real education, thus
increasing the likelihood of eventual default. It should be noted, how-
ever, that poor quality services are a danger both in purely private
transaction (e.g., car mechanics) and in publicly provided services
(e.g., state motor vehicle departments). The relevant question is not
whether some clients may receive inferior service; undoubtedly, some
will. The question is, rather, whether there is reason to believe
voucher clients will receive lower service quality than if they were given
cash to purchase the services, on one hand, or provided the services by
public employees (or contractors), on the other.
Id.
26. Butler, supra note 20, at 118.
27. The most prominent proponent of school vouchers is, of course, the
American Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman. See generally
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM ch. 6 (1962).
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toward the kinds of "effective-school" organizations that
academics and reformers would like to impose on the pub-
lic schools. Of course, not all schools in the market will
respond equally well to these incentives. But those that fal-
ter will find it more difficult to attract support, and they
will tend to be weeded out in favor of schools that are bet-
ter organized. This process of natural selection, based on
ease of entry and performance-based attrition, comple-
ments the incentives of the marketplace in propelling and
supporting a population of autonomous, effectively organ-
ized schools.
28
Markets for social welfare services, like all other markets, do
not require that all buyers be wise: A well-functioning market
needs just enough savvy consumers competing to buy better (or
cheaper) products to create a demand to which suppliers
respond. This benefits everyone in the market, not just those
who are initially the most astute (unless the suppliers can some-
how segment the market).29 Consider how all American cars
improved thanks to competition from abroad, even though only
some consumers sought the "better" foreign cars.
Economists argue about how many savvy consumers are
needed and how well-informed they need to be. The consensus
answer is: Not many. In fact, some economists argue that it is
only the marginal consumer who matters.
Generally, in a well-functioning market in which price is
determined by the intersection of demand and supply, providers
are forced to sell their product at the prevailing market price in
order to sell all that they have available. This is called a "price-
takers' market"-providers have to produce according to the
"market-revealed value of goods."3 Especially for highly diversi-
fied goods, where consumers have a variety of options that meet
their needs, markets are self-regulating-the individual provider
will gain no benefit from straying from the market standard,
because there are so many other providers consumers may turn
to if prices rise or quality deteriorates. In the words of Nobel
Prize winning economist George Stigler:
28. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 190 (1990).
29. The best example is the way U.S. airlines can set so many different
prices for the same seats on the plane-based on when the ticket is purchased,
etc., which in effect segments the markets between business and vacation
travelers.
30. ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, UNDrERsrrY ECONOMIcs 287
(2d ed. 1964).
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[F]rom the manufacturer's viewpoint, uncertainty con-
cerning his price is clearly disadvantageous. The cost of
search is a cost of purchase, and consumption will there-
fore be smaller, the greater the dispersion of prices and
the greater the optimum amount of search. This is pre-
sumably one reason. .. why uniform prices are set by sell-
ers of nationally advertised brands: if they have eliminated
price variation, they have reduced the cost of the commod-
ity (including search) to the buyer, even if the dealers'
margins average somewhat more than they otherwise
would. 1
Note that this analysis does not require consumers to be
especially wise, or even literate. Rather, they need to have clear
tastes or preferences, and the ability to exercise them.
Recipient decision making can also lower program costs if
recipients are given sufficient reason to be cost conscious.3 2 As
described below, the most direct way to do so is through cash
assistance, but cost consciousness also can be induced by requir-
ing a meaningful copayment in either a reimbursed fee-for-ser-
vice or voucher system (or by refunding the unused portion of
the voucher). The point is: Recipients must directly benefit from
obtaining a better price for a good or service (or suffer for not
doing so). In other words, cash payments let them choose a less
expensive service provider (or not to consume as much of the
good or service)-and use the difference (the amount saved) for
other purposes. This creates downward pressure on their indi-
vidual expenditures, on total expenditures, and also on the price
of goods and services purchased.
31. George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 223
(1961).
32. According to one study:
Competitive markets force producers to seek low-cost solutions. Pro-
ducers in a competitive market cannot increase prices much above a
competitor's price. The only way to increase profits is to reduce costs.
With lower costs, a producer either has a higher rate of profit or
reduces price to capture market share. In either case, other producers
are alerted that a better way has been found to deliver a product or
service, spurring them to seek new, cheaper ways of delivering the
service.
As long as the recipient has a choice, these cost reductions shouldn't
be achieved at the cost of reduced quality. Why? Because if service
quality falls, recipients will change providers. The competitive market
lets producers and consumers engage in a dialogue about cost and
quality issues. The simple act of exchange allows both sides to
exchange information and discover what the best price/quality combi-
nation will be.
Hall & Eggers, supra note 17, at 4 n.13.
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Bottom-up systems also produce more options or flexibility
in the services available to recipients. It is easier for individual
agencies to modify their programs to meet the needs of particu-
lar clients or groups of clients than it is for a central, top-down
authority to anticipate all the possibilities and provide for them
in the grant or contract.33 Writing for the Reason Foundation,
John Hall, at the time at George Mason University, and William
D. Eggers, at the time at the Reason Public Policy Institute,
explain:
By putting the choice of providers in the hands of consum-
ers, vouchers also have the potential to break up produc-
ers' monopoly on the supply of social services. The result
should be an overall increase in the supply, quality, and
diversity of providers. Vouchers should prompt suppliers
to tailor their programs and services to better meet the par-
ticular needs and circumstances of voucher holders. Prov-
iders will begin to specialize in meeting different market
niches.
3 4
Child care is a good example:
Parents know best whether their children need small, quiet
settings where providers can devote time to interacting with the
children, or settings with larger groups of peers to provide social
stimulation. Parents can also balance quality, location, and cost
in a way that is best for their children and themselves. Current
policies generally support parental choice in child care because
it is believed to yield the best arrangement for both the children
and the families. Over time, these choices should encourage
providers to offer the types and qualities of child care that par-
ents prefer.
3 5
Some parents want, or need, only half-day care; some need
evening or after-hours care; and others need full-day care, per-
haps with extended hours. Some parents want their children
33. Stoesz, supra note 25, at 5, citing Harry Hatry.
Providers, given this incentive to be more responsive, may eventually
develop proficiency in addressing specialized needs within their
broader service area. Similarly, vouchers offer professionals dedicated
to working with the poor the opportunity to develop innovative
approaches to working with this population with potentially less
bureaucratic interference from the public welfare apparatus. Innova-
tive, indigenous programming can be supported by social service
vouchers.
Id.
34. Hall & Eggers, supra note 17, at 4.
35. Christine Ross & Stuart Kerachsky, Strategies for Program Integration, in
ENHANCING EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS: BURDENS AND OPPORTUNITIES 39-40
(Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1996).
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cared for by other family members; some want to use neighbors;
others want a nursery school; and still others a care center, per-
haps in a church. Some parents may want all their children of
different ages in one place; others may not care. Some parents
will want their children close to home; others will want them
close to work. The variations are almost infinite. Accommodat-
ing such variation is all but impossible in a top-down regime.
Only bottom-up, market-driven systems give low-income recipi-
ents a range of choices remotely comparable to those available to
middle- and upper-income families. To explain further:
Using vouchers, parents can shape the child care market to
provide more of the types and features of child care that
they want. Vouchers expand parents' choice of providers
to include relatives and informal providers-persons who
are generally not included in contract systems.3 6
Also, because the distribution of service providers is not
dependent on centralized contracting, market-driven systems
tend to reduce the income segregation of clients inherent in pro-
grams based on top-down grants and contracts (unless the num-
ber of providers is restricted by administrative or statutory rule).
It is impossible for public authorities to enter into contracts or
make grants to all potential service providers, so there is a ten-
dency to fund those providers who specialize in serving the eco-
nomically disadvantaged or the neighborhoods where they
predominate. On the other hand, low-income children using
child care vouchers are more likely to be integrated with chil-
dren from other socio-economic backgrounds." (Of course, the
agencies or firms serving the middle class must be willing to
accept the voucher.)
These are all theoretical arguments, of course, so it is com-
forting to see that theory translates into practice, at least some-
times. In the United States in the early 1980s, interest grew in
using certificates or vouchers to provide government-funded
child care. The results of various experiments and pilot
36. Id. at 56.
37. Recently, a controversy has erupted over the use of housing vouchers
to achieve residential integration. The opponents of doing so point out that
the cost of providing housing in more affluent neighborhoods raises program
costs substantially, and argue that lower-income neighbors tend to reduce hous-
ing values and the neighborhood "quality." This debate too easily raises ques-
tions of racial discrimination beyond the scope of this paper. For present
purposes, it is simply worth noting that recipient-directed systems can be a pow-
erful tool for various purposes. See Howard Husock, Voucher Plan for Housing: A
Trojan Horse, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1994, at A14.
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projects38 (see Box 2) led policy makers to conclude that bottom-
up funding was indeed feasible, and perhaps preferable in many
circumstances. As a result, U.S. federal law was changed to
require states to offer parents "a certificate, check, or other dis-
bursement that is issued ... directly to a parent who may use it
only to pay for child care services from a variety of providers
(including center-based, group home, family, and in-home child
care), or, if required, as a deposit for services." 9
Box 2
CHILD CARE VOUCHERS IN HUDSON COUNTY, NEW JERSEY
In the early 1980s, the New Jersey Department of Health and Human
Services determined that there was a shortage of child care "slots" available
for its low-income clients at state-owned and state-subsidized centers in
Hudson County. At the same time, private centers were reporting 17%
vacancy rate. Thus, instead of building more state facilities or contracting
for expanded state-subsidized centers, the department conducted a two-
year child care voucher demonstration in the county.
Previously, Hudson County has provided child care for low-income families
through sixz state owned and operated centers serving 448 children and an
additional 454 child care slots purchased through contracts with private
centers. This system was no longer adequate for the growing need for
child care in the community, was facing sharply escalating costs, and
provided poor access to child care for parents in nine of Hudson County's
twelve communities because of "historical funding patterns which tied day
care subsidies to particular localities."
Parents were given vouchers equal to 75% of the State's prevailing contract
rates for child care, thus, $37.50 per child per week for center-based care
and $16.90 per child per week for family day care. Parents could use the
vouchers for in-home and relative-provided care, or at any licenses family
day care home or center.
The evaluators concluded that the project demonstrated the successful use
of vouchers by low-income parents. The parents were able to use the
vouchers in the broader market for child care services. Moreover, the
vouchers provided a means of providing care for those children previously
excluded from subsidized care because of their geographic location. And,
since the vouchers were pegged at a lower price than State contract rates,
costs were 25% lower.
Source: Barbara Catteral & Carol Williams, New Jersey Bureau of Research,
Evaluation, and Quality Assurance, Division of Youth and Family Services, Voucher
Subsidized Child Care: The Hudson County Project 2-8 (1985).
38. See, e.g., BARBARA CATTERALL & CAROL WILLIAMS, NEW JERSEY BUREAU
OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, AND QUALITY ASSURANCE, DIVISION OF YOUTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES, VOUCHER SUBSIDIZED CHILD CARE: THE HUDSON COUNTY PRO-
JECT (1985).
39. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
STATES' CHILD CARE CERTIFICATE SYSTEMS: AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILI-
TIES AND BARRIERS 53 (1998).
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There is another, almost unexpected benefit of bottom-up
systems. Osborne and Gaebler explain that separate institutions
for the poor tend to become stigmatized, but "if we do not limit
the program or institution to the poor, we have no way of ensur-
ing equity.. .because the affluent become the most intense users
of the service." In the case of public universities, tax dollars
intended to make higher education broadly affordable are being
used "to subsidize higher education primarily for the middle and
upper middle class." Osborne and Gaebler continue, "When
governments fund individuals rather than institutions, it is much
easier to promote equity .... This also removes the stigma of
subsidies for the poor by allowing them to participate in the
mainstream-to attend any school, live in any apartment build-
ing within their means, use any health clinic."4 °
The use of housing vouchers and certificates demonstrate
this effect. Public housing projects, especially in the United
States, are notorious for creating ghettos of immobilized
(trapped?) and marginalized low-income families.
In the United States in 1996, the last year for which data
were found, of $21.7 billion in total federal housing expendi-
tures, $8.1 billion were in the form of vouchers or certificates.41
Because the housing subsidy is provided in the form of a
voucher, households can choose where to live. The subsidy is
tied to the household, not to the housing unit. In some pro-
grams, there used to be an incentive for families to be cost-con-
scious: If they find a unit that rented for less than the amount of
the voucher, they got to keep the difference.
The one major evaluation of this program concluded that
vouchers and certificates successfully implemented recipient
choice with few negative side effects.42 Most importantly, 46% of
new or recently moved voucher recipients paid 30% or less of
their income for rent.4 3 Recipient tastes were important. Given
a voucher, some households moved to better but more expensive
housing; some moved to better but less expensive housing; and
some moved to worse but less expensive housing. (See Box 3)
All these benefits of bottom-up approaches, of course,
require a functioning, decentralized market. When one already
exists, the argument for bottom-up approaches is easier to make.
40. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 2, at 180-86.
41. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., SECTION 8 TENANT-BASED HOUSING ASSISTANCE:
OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE HUD's FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 36 (1998).
42. See STEPHEN D. KENNEDY & MIREILLE D. LEGER, FINAL COMPREHENSIVE
REPORT OF THE FREESTANDING HOUSING VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION 23 (1990).
43. See Memorandum from Paul Leonard to Christopher D. Lord, Legis-
lative Dir., Senate Banking Comm. Staff (May 1, 1997) (on file with author).
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Box 3
TENANT-BASED VS. PROJECT-BASED HOUSING ASSISTANCE
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
provides two types of housing assistance, tenant-based assistance and
project-based assistance. Tenant-based assistance differs from project-
based assistance in that tenant-based assistance ties the subsidy directly to
the family instead of to the housing unit. Thus, participants can choose
where they want to live and can move while still maintaining their benefit.
Until 1999, HUD operated two tenant-based assistance programs-a
certificate program and a voucher program. Private owners could agree to
accept the certificate or voucher as a rental payment, and the rented units
were required to meet health and safety standards set by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and the state or local Public Housing
Authority (PHA).
In the certificate program, households could choose where to live, but the
rental amount had to be within the HUD-determined fair market rent for a
given area and type of housing (set at the 40th percentile-the dollar
amount below which 40% of standard quality housing rents in a given
area). The certificate amount was set at the difference between the rent
charged and 30% of the household's adjusted income, and the household
was required to pay 30% of their adjusted income as rent.
In the voucher program, households received a voucher subsidy amount
determined by the difference between a payment standard (generally set
between 80-100% of the fair market rent) and 30% of their adjusted
income. There was no limit on the rent the household selected, but if it
found a unit that rented for less than its 30% contribution plus the subsidy,
it could keep the difference. Households were required to pay at least 10%
of their adjusted income or $25, whichever was greater, for rent.
A 1990 Abt Associates study found that most households participating in
the certificate or voucher program were able to find and secure housing.
Most importantly, 46% of new or recently moved voucher recipients paid
30% or less of their income for rent. Recipient tastes were important.
Given a voucher, some households moved to better but more expensive
housing; some moved to better but less expensive housing; and some
moved to worse but less expensive housing.
Source. Stephen D. Kennedy & Mireille D. Leger, Final Comprehensive Report of the
Freestanding Housing Voucher Demonstration 23 (1990).
(The preexisting private market for health care is what made
reimbursed fee-for-service systems so easy to establish.) When a
market does not already exist, however, the proponents of bot-
tom-up approaches need to show that one will develop. (Fears
that such a market will not develop for elementary and secondary
education has been a major obstacle to generating more support
for school voucher programs.)
Of course, one of the arguments for vouchers and other
market-driven approaches is that they tend to encourage the
growth of such markets, which benefit all recipients. But the bar-
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riers to market entry-perhaps caused by high start-up costs,
stringent licensing or quality control requirements, or a low
profit potential-may simply be too great in particular program
areas. There may also be differences based on population con-
centrations, with, for example, more potential providers in urban
and suburban communities than in rural ones.44
Moreover, there will always be some recipients who are not
good consumers. In particular program areas, there will be
many who lack the requisite information, judgment, or interest
to make wise decisions. And, in some program areas, there will
be agencies that try to "cream" clients, that is, that try to attract
the easiest, and least costly, to serve. The result of both factors
could be educational ghettos of poor students, social service
agencies serving the hardest to reach, and so forth. Thus,
despite a likely overall improvement of services, the possibility
that some (or many) recipients might be left behind has led
many experts to reject market-oriented approaches, and is cer-
tainly reason for careful consideration before adopting them in
particular instances.
Clearly, recipient decision making is not appropriate for all
areas of social welfare. Recipients must have a sufficient personal
interest in the effectiveness of the particular service-and func-
tion at an adequate level to make informed and responsible
choices. For example, it is easier to trust, or at least accept, recip-
ient choice for purchases of food and housing, where the recipi-
ent's own interests are clearly at stake, than in elementary and
secondary education, where other considerations may
predominate. Likewise, it may be easier to provide recipient
choice in markets that already have a large number of private
suppliers, than in others, like education, which are dominated by
44. But even this generalization can prove incorrect. One scholar has
commented:
An oft-cited concern about vouchers is whether there would be
enough providers to provide choice for consumers for certain low vol-
ume services or in rural areas. For example, in sparsely populated
North Dakota, one might anticipate problems ensuring an adequate
supply of services. In reality, however, North Dakota officials reported
that the supply of services has increased as a result of the consumer
demand generated from their reimbursement model of consumer
purchasing. This has created opportunities for new providers.
Richard Dougherty with William D. Eggers, Delivering Better Services for the Men-
tally Ill and Developmentally Disabled: A Consumer Choice Model, 215 PRIVATIZATION
CENTER POL'Y STUD. 10 (1996).
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government agencies or where the barriers to entry may be
substantial.45
Furthermore, recipient decision making may not be appro-
priate for (1) involuntary interventions or authoritative services,
such as those for child abusers, and (2) incompetent or dysfunc-
tional recipients. As Stuart Butler asks: "Should drug addicts
undergoing treatment have complete freedom to choose which
organizations shall serve them? That may be better than the
alternatives in many instances, but there would be plenty of
opportunities for exploitation."46 Thus, warn Hall and Eggers:
"For some services, such as court-ordered drug and alcohol or
mental health treatment, the state may find it counterproductive
to allow for choice because recipients may opt for the least rigor-
ous program, thus making their choice at odds with the outcome
most socially desirable."47
Top-down approaches have another advantage that bears
note: They make rationing the good or service politically easier.
(Some people, of course, would consider this a disadvantage.) If
there are not funds to provide goods or services for all those for-
mally eligible for them, a bottom-up regime requires explicit
rationing. The central political authority, in a relatively visible
manner, must decide, for example, who gets the voucher, what
service is provided, and so forth. In top-down systems, the cen-
tral authority's rationing is less visible-because it is more likely
to appear to happen at the agency level.4" In addition, some
argue that "by increasing the quality and supply of government-
financed services, vouchers will likely increase the demand for
45. As noted above, concerns about the ability to generate a successful
market in elementary and secondary education is one reason for the lack of
stronger support for school vouchers, and for the popularity of "charter
schools," that is, independent schools supported by public funds pursuant to a
"charter," but operated by either a public or private group. Students apply to
attend the school, and there is usually a rule that prevents the charter school
from imposing particular selection criteria. The charters, typically issued by a
state or local school board, allow various institutions-such as committees of
parents or teachers, local clubs, or even profit-seeking firms-to set up and
operate a school. Although the school is subject to the same student learning
standards and requirements as schools under public jurisdiction, the managing
institution is free to determine its own curriculum and teaching methods. See
generally Bruno V. Manno, et al., How Charter Schools are Different: Lessons and
Implications From a National Study, 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 488-98 (Mar. 1998).
46. Butler, supra note 20, at 120.
47. Hall & Eggers, supra note 17, at 4 n.12.
48. Limiting the value of a voucher can be another form of rationing, but
since it is more often used to control costs that are deemed difficult to control,
it is discussed below.
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the service, thereby making controlling overall program expendi-
tures more difficult than previously."49
For all these reasons, the consideration of recipient-directed
systems must be on a program-area-by-program-area basis, as
described in the second part of this paper.
One final point: The foregoing argument in favor of recipi-
ent decision making is instrumental in nature; that is, it seeks to
make social welfare systems more efficient. However, in many
program areas, a broader, normative argument can be made: If
the middle class can choose its own service providers, why not the
poor? As David Stoesz, of the Virginia Commonwealth University
School of Social Work, writes, "Vouchers afford social services cli-
ents the same consumer sovereignty enjoyed by those who
purchase such services in the open market-the power to end
services that are not useful, and the opportunity to shop for care
that is more helpful."5 °
Moreover, vouchers and other recipient-directed systems
can do the following:
[They] could eliminate much of the paternalism inherent
in the public welfare quasi-monopoly. One of the most
egregious assumptions of many direct service delivery pro-
grams is that social welfare clients are incapable of defin-
ing what is in their best interests. Instead of relying on the
client's judgment, public welfare professionals have often
usurped consumer authority in personal matters. While
such paternalism is warranted for certain types of services,
such as substance abuse treatment, or for particularly vul-
nerable clients, such as children in need of protection, it is
patronizing to assume that an inability to choose wisely
holds for all clients of all public social services.
51
C. Government's 'Fatal Embrace"?
As mentioned above, contracting out for services is often
called "privatization." But top-down funding also tends to
increase government's influence over private agencies, including
those operated by society's mediating institutions. 52 For, when
government chooses the service (or agency) for clients, it tends
to prescribe, or at least highly regulate, the nature of the services
provided by private agencies. Smith and Lipsky comment:
"Instead of shrinking the role of government and making the
49. Hall & Eggers, supra note 17, at 13.
50. Stoesz, supra note 25, at 5.
51. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
52. See note 3 for a definition of mediating institutions.
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provision of public services subject to market discipline, con-
tracting has actually diminished and constrained the community
sector by government intervention in nonprofit organizations."53
Government, of course, has broad power to regulate the
activities of mediating structures and other private agencies-
even when it is not funding them. Whether through legislative
fiat or licensing rules, government can regulate almost all aspects
of private agency operations. (In all but a few states, for exam-
ple, church-based day care is regulated even when no public
funds are involved.)
Government is much less likely to regulate private agencies,
however, if it is not actually arranging for the service. Passing
legislation or adopting administrative regulations is often a long,
drawn-out process requiring support at the highest levels of the
government agency-whose visibility often arouses important
political interests. On the other hand, attaching programmatic
conditions to a contract or grant is a relatively invisible and low-
level process. It also has the special justification that, since pub-
lic money is involved, it should be spent in accordance with the
"public trust."
This heightened level of government control is understanda-
ble-after all, the contract is meant to serve a public purpose,
not to sustain a private enterprise-but the effect is the same:
Distant, government decision makers dictate the shape of local
services. "As 'agents of the state,"' writes Joe Dolan, now execu-
tive director of the Achelis and Bodman Foundations in New
York, "non-profits become disconnected from local mediating
institutions such as schools, churches, businesses and neighbor-
hood, family or parent-oriented groups."54
This is not some abstract or hypothetical concern. In area
after area, the conditions attached to government funding have
altered the nature of private agency services and raised their
costs. Even successful providers are often required to alter their
programs if they are to receive government funding. As Smith
and Lipsky explain, " [P] rivatization has led to government pene-
tration of the private sector through the regulations, obligations
and restrictions that accompany contracts. It has created rules
and regulations for private agencies that otherwise would not be
subject to government control."55
53. SMITH & LIPsKy, supra note 6, at 204.
54. Joseph S. Dolan, Letter to the Editor, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Aug.
10, 1993, at 44.
55. SMITH & LIPsKy, supra note 6, at 204.
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The programmatic requirements imposed by government
on the services it funds or purchases tend to increase the cost of
the agency's services, often without improving quality. Govern-
ment often dictates costly "quality" standards, for example, with
less concern about whether such standards actually improve the
service than would individuals (who would have to pay for the
"improved" service out of their own pockets). No better example
of this two-sided dynamic exists than the quality/cost differentials
between publicly and privately funded child care.
Although estimates vary, and undoubtedly depend on the
types of care provided, regulated child care costs from 10 to 30%
more than unregulated care.56 Gormley, in his study of family
day care home regulation in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, for
example, "found cost increases directly attributable to regula-
tion. The cost of home improvements alone was $936 per pro-
vider."57 Gormley also conducted a survey of local regulation in
cities with populations greater than 50,000, and "found extensive
local regulation of relatively small family day care homes. For
example, family day care providers who care for six children are
required to have a business license in 39 percent of these cities;
an occupancy permit in 43 percent; and a zoning permit in 28
percent.'58
Beside raising costs for parents, these regulatory burdens
reduce the supply of providers, especially family day care homes.
Gormley found that regulation was responsible both for declines
in the growth of new licensed providers and declines in the
actual numbers of licensed providers of family day care.59 (As a
result, many providers operate as unlicensed family day care
homes, further complicating government's ability to maintain
some standard of care.)
But is regulated child care better? Ron Haskins, then on the
professional staff of the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee,
wrote that one "problem with studies of child care quality is that
the observed correlations are modest and nearly all the studies
56. For example, the Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey 1990,
based on a nationally representative sample of families with children under age
13, found that the hourly fee for regulated family day care was $1.64 per hour,
compared to $1.48 per hour for nonregulated family day care. See BARBARA
WILLER ET AL., NAT'L. ASS'N FOR THE EDUC. OF YOUNG CHILDREN, THE DEMAND
AND SUPPLY OF CHILD CARE IN 1990 30 (1991).
57. William T. Gormley, Jr., Regulating Mister Rogers' Neighborhood: The
Dilemmas of Day Care Regulation, THE BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1990, at 24 [hereinaf-
ter Mister Rogers' Neighborhood].
58. Id. at 25.
59. See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, EvERYBoDY's CHILDREN: CHILD CARE AS A
PUBLIC PROBLEM 103-04 (1995).
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are short-term." 6° Moreover, sometimes the regulation seems
irrelevant to research findings about "quality." Staff/child ratios
are among the most common subjects of regulation, and as Gor-
mley notes, an "Abt Associates study of group day care centers
found, not surprisingly, that lower child-staff ratios result in
higher costs."6 1 However, "the Abt Associates study found that
low child-staff ratios, though beneficial, made less of a difference
than, for instance, group size."62
Often, besides raising costs, the imposition of such "quality"
or "professional" standards also acts to exclude community-based
or informal service providers by raising to prohibitive levels the
costs for them to enter the market. On the other hand, it is not
always easier to rely on unregulated or community-based pro-
grams. Stuart Butler describes the predicament in which public
(and private) funders find themselves when they wish to support
community-based (and therefore less professionally creden-
tialed) agencies:
How do funding officials discharge their fiduciary responsi-
bility, ensuring that money goes to qualified, bona fide
organizations and yet also direct funds to the most deserv-
ing new institutions? In the real world, even an insightful
funding officer has tojustify his or her decisions to a super-
visor, auditor, or oversight committee chairman who will
see only the paperwork associated with a funding decision.
The pressure on that officer is to show traditional creden-
tials and long experience in a group he has funded. The
fiduciary responsibility thus invariably runs counter to the
urge to assist the more creative but least "professional"
mediating structures. And this dilemma is made more dif-
ficult by the tactics of the professional organizations who
see "amateur" groups as competitors for funding. Not sur-
prisingly, these professional groups lead the demand for
credential requirements to "protect the public" from
"unqualified" organizations or individuals.6 3
Finally, there is a political dimension to large-scale, top-
down funding: Private agencies tend to become dependent on
government-not just on the government's money but also its
good will. Because government officials are awarding the con-
60. Ron Haskins, Reform of Federal Child Care Programs, Address at the
Day Care and Early Childhood Programs Under Welfare Reform Conference at
the American Enterprise Institute (Mar. 24-25, 1997).
61. Gormley, Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, supra note 57, at 24.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Butler, supra note 20, at 120.
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tracts or grants, criticizing government policies becomes even
more difficult.
Mutual dependence blurs the lines between public and pri-
vate. The agencies now often depend on government
financing. A 1988 survey of the Child Welfare League of
America concluded that government support accounted
for, on average, 59 percent of its member agency revenues.
A 1991 survey of over 350 nonprofit social service agencies
in Massachusetts found that 52 percent of agency income
was from state contracts, and an additional 17 percent
from nonstate-contract government funding such as Medi-
caid. A 1991 survey of 276 nonprofit social service, educa-
tional, and cultural agencies in the Raleigh-Durham-
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, region found that 45 percent
of total funding was from government, if hospitals and uni-
versities were excluded. Fully one-quarter of all nonprofits
in the region received over one-half of their revenue from
government. A 1989 survey of nonprofits in the New York
metropolitan region found that government funding con-
tributed almost half of total revenue.
64
"Allegiance is to government-government periodicals, gov-
ernment conferences, government policy, more government
funding, and officials who favor the expansion of government
programs," decries Dolan.6 5 Although bottom-up systems also
can create dependency on government funds, there is a big dif-
ference: the financial dependency of private agencies or groups
is not nearly as subject to the government's good will, since recip-
ients-not government officials-decide whether they get
funded.
Mediating institutions are at special risk to all these forces
because top-down government funding often requires them to
abandon the very features, like religious activities, that make
them effective.66 These entangling strings can have "a profound
and damaging impact on mediating structures," according to Stu-
art Butler:
Invariably, it encourages, or even requires, organizations to
surrender their special character and position in society as
they seek to comply with government requirements. By
making these organizations less concerned with satisfying
64. SMITH & LIPSKY, supra note 6, at 4.
65. Dolan, supra note 54, at 44.
66. For a dramatic example of how government aid can change the whole
character of a private agency, see Marvin Olasky, The Corruption of Religious Char-
ities, in BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 94.
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the local community, and more sensitive to the demands of
a distant official, it weakens their relationship with that
community.
67
That is why government aid has been called a "fatal
embrace."6 8
"Unless that problem is solved," warn Peter L. Berger of Bos-
ton University and Richard John Neuhaus of the Institute on
Religion and Public Life, "when such institutions are first 'discov-
ered' and then funded by government, the very vitality that origi-
nally distinguished the institutions from government agencies is
destroyed. Indeed they become government agencies under
another name."6 9 As Berger and Neuhaus elaborate, "In the
1970s, we underestimated the degree of corruption that comes
with government funding-not, of course, corruption in the
sense of criminal misuse of funds (that is a relatively manageable
matter), but the much more insidious corruption in which these
institutions reshape themselves to continue as beneficiaries of
government largesse. "70
The problem is so great that some thoughtful observers
denounce all government assistance to mediating structures.
However, many elements of the modern social welfare state are
simply too expensive to be funded by the private sector alone.
(Housing for the poor, residential care for the elderly, health
care services generally, and foster care for abused and neglected
children, come immediately to mind.) According to John DiIu-
lio, writing when he was at Princeton University, "[E]ven if every
charitable organization in America gave their entire endowment
to social welfare causes, that would cover only one-seventh of
what the public sector now spends on social welfare."
7'
If mediating structures are to be a major part of modern
social welfare states without losing their essential character, we
67. Butler, supra note 20, at 22.
68. Of course, the government can regulate the activities of mediating
structures even when not giving them money. But the temptation to attach
requirements to the behavior of mediating structures-and the political sup-
port for doing so-is greatly increased when there is direct funding, as
described above. (There is also a tendency to regulate the content of services in
bottom-up systems, but it is not nearly as great as in top-down regimes because
the government has less palpable responsibility for the nature and quality of the
service.)
69. BERGER & NEUHIAUS, supra note 2, at 150.
70. Id. at 151.
71. John Dilulio, Am. ENTER. INST., Annual Policy Conference (Dec. 2,
1997).
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must, as Berger and Neuhaus urge, protect them from the "fatal
embrace of government regulation."72
Hence, the significance of bottom-up approaches: Funding
based on cumulative recipient demand is less threatening to the
independence of private agencies because, when individuals
rather than government bureaucrats are the decision makers,
institution-distorting strings are less likely to be attached.73
The operative words, however, are "less likely." With the
exception of cash assistance, even bottom-up approaches
increase the risk of greater government influence over mediating
structures. Stuart Butler makes the point that "accepting a
voucher may turn out to be a poisoned chalice for an organiza-
tion, encumbering it with heavy regulation. This is of particular
concern to private schools in the debate over education choice.
Nonetheless, vouchers appear to carry much less of this danger
than direct forms of government support. ' 74 Even when the bot-
tom-up aid comes with no strings, some thoughtful observers fear
that the mere acceptance of public aid in a heretofore area of
private activity builds additional and deleterious dependence on
the government.
There is no one answer to whether top-down or bottom-up
approaches are better. The answer depends on the specific situa-
tion, and what values one holds to be most important. Box 4 sets
forth the general factors to be considered in deciding between
the two systems.
Box 4
"TOP-DOWN" VS. "BOTtOM-UP" FUNDING?
" Is there already a market for the goods or services involved? Or, can
one be created? Conversely, are there barriers to entry for new
providers that may preclude the development of true market
competition?
" Will the recipients, as a group, be wise consumers of the program's
goods or services?
" Should recipients be allowed to choose service providers or is the
service involuntary or coercive in nature?
" Will the goods or service be rationed, or will they be provided to all
who meet specific eligibility criteria?
" Is close government regulation of the good or service needed? Or can
providers be free to offer it as they see fit? Particularly, can mediating
structures offer services under the terms of their private values or
beliefs?
72. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 150.
73. See Butler, supra note 20, at 122 ("Organizations could then receive
support with little or no regulation but with the crucial requirement that they
justify themselves to the people who part with their own money.").
74. Id. at 119.
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II. MARKET MECHANISMS
Bottom-up, recipient-directed systems have been used for
medical services, housing, transportation, food, child care, edu-
cation, job training, and certain counseling and rehabilitation
services, such as those for the mentally ill or developmentally dis-
abled. Vouchers are the most familiar market mechanism, but
lower taxes, cash assistance, and fee-for-service systems can also
be used to implement a bottom-up social welfare regime. Choos-
ing the most appropriate market mechanism for a specific pro-
gram area requires considering the needs and capacities of
recipients, as well as local service structures or markets (or poten-
tial markets). It also requires answering two linked questions:
Should recipients be encouraged to consume the particular good
or service? And, should they be encouraged to be cost
conscious?
This section examines the considerations underlying each of
the major market mechanisms:
" lower taxes (including deductions and credits),
" cash assistance (including refundable tax credits),
" reimbursed fee-for-services, and
" vouchers.
A. Lower taxes
Government aid is unnecessary, of course, if people can
afford to pay for the goods or services themselves. Although this
is basically a question of their having sufficient income or sav-
ings, lower taxes could free a significant number of individuals
and families from the need for some types of government assis-
tance. Consider the following: Between 1960 and 1998, the tax
burden in OECD countries rose from 27.7% to 37.2% of GDP.
75
In European OECD countries, the tax increases were even
greater, rising from 30.9% to 39.8% of GDP.
76
In the United States, for example, over the past fifty years, a
greater portion of the federal tax burden has been shifted from
taxpayers without dependent children to lower- and middle-
income families with dependent children.77 One of the main
75. See Historical Statistics: 1960-1995, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development table 6.6 (Paris, 1997). [hereinafter Historical Sta-
tistics]. For 1998 figures, see A World of Taxes, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/fa/stats-
stats. htm.
76. Id. For 1998 figures, see Tax burden 2001: International Comparison, at
http: //www.estv. admin. ch/data/sd/e/inter/pdf / isquo.21. pdf
77. See Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1997: Hearing on H.A 1040
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) (Statement of
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reasons for this shift has been the decline in the relative value of
the personal exemption.7 8
From 1948 to 2000, the personal exemption was increased
from $600 to $2,800. 79 Had the exemption been adjusted to
keep pace with inflation, its value would have been $4,287. For
lower-income taxpayers (in the 15% marginal tax bracket), this
adjustment would have reduced a family's tax liability by about
$225 per child. For higher-income taxpayers (in the 28% margi-
nal tax bracket), the reduction would have been about $415 per
child. (The Earned Income Tax Credit, as described below, off-
sets some of this increase-but only for the lower-income taxpay-
ers, generally with earnings below $28,000 a year.)
But this is merely an adjustment for inflation. Had the
exemption been adjusted for the growth in per capita income, to
negate the effect of "bracket creep" and other factors in the
American tax regime, the exemption would have been a whop-
ping $10,689. For lower-income taxpayers, the result would have
been a reduction in the family's tax liability of about $1,185 per
child; higher-income taxpayers would have seen a reduction of
about $2,200 per child.
How to put this in context? The size of this increase in tax
burdens varies by family income and size, but here is one exam-
ple: According to a 1998 U.S. Department of Treasury report,
from 1955 to 1996, the income of a four-person American family
at one-half the median nearly doubled, from $15,804 to
$28,271.80 During that same period, the tax burden on such a
family rose nearly ten-fold, from $316 (2000 dollars) to $2,989.
(As a percent of income, it increased from 2% to 10.57%.) Most
of this growth had occurred before 1981, and, indeed, the tax
burden peaked in 1986 at 13.79% of income.
C. Eugene Steuerle, "This decline in the dependency exemption, along with
increases in Social Security taxes, has increased the tax burden of families with
children relative to almost all other taxpayers.").
78. See C. Eugene Steurle & Jason Juffras, URa. INST., A $1,000 TAx
CREDIT FOR EVERY CHILD: A BASE OF REFORM FOR THE NATION'S TAX, WELFARE,
AND HEALTH SYSTEMS (1991); C. Eugene Steuerle, The Tax Treatment of House-
holds of Different Size, in TAxING THE FAMILY 73-97 (Rudolph Penner ed., 1983).
79. Beginning in 1997, the personal exemption is phased out for high-
income taxpayers.
80. See ALLEN H. LERMAN, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, AVERAGE AND MARGI-
NAL FEDERAL INCOME, SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE, AND COMBINED TAx RATES
FOR FOUR-PERSON FAMILIES AT THE SAME RELATIVE POSITIONS IN THE INCOME Dis-
TRIBUTION, 1995-1999 tbl. 3 (1998). The tax burden calculations are based on
the assumption that all income is earned by one spouse and that the family uses
the "married filingjointly" filing status. The effects of the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) are also included, assuming two eligible dependents.
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This increased tax burden places added financial stress on
lower- and middle-income families and creates more pressure in
two-parent households for both parents to work."1 (The $500
per child tax credit, created by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
helps offset the decline in the value of the personal
exemption.)
8 2
Some experts justify this higher tax burden on the basis that
low- and middle-income families now receive additional benefits
from the federal government. But why take money from families
in order to give it back to them? Taking money from families (or
all taxpayers, for that matter) and giving it back to them in the
form of categorical assistance is a way of controlling their spend-
ing decisions. As Stuart Butler explains, tax relief could:
leave more money in the pockets of ordinary Americans,
letting them allocate that money to the organizations of
their choice rather than taking that money and then forc-
ing people to use organizations of the government's
choice. This philosophy is at the heart of proposals to
reduce taxes on families in tandem with reductions in gov-
ernment funding for social services. The central issue in
this approach is not about whether it is a good idea to
spend money on school lunches or other services or
whether nonprofit organizations should be funded. The
central issue is who should control that spending and
decide which institutions should receive support.83
For example, tax funds go to tax-paying families to help pay
for college and other post-secondary education. In 2000, Pell
Grants averaged about $2,000 and subsidized Stafford student
loans averaged about $4,300.84 This is like taking money from
one of the taxpayer's pockets and putting it in another-because
we think that parents cannot (or will not) save the money
themselves.
Forced saving, or intertemporal redistribution of wealth,
sometimes makes good policy sense-particularly when the cost
for the good or service is very high, cannot be adequately insured
against, or involves socially useful behaviors subject to undercon-
81. See Douglas J. Besharov & John C. Weicher, Return the Family to 1954,
WALL ST. J., July 8, 1985.
82. The maximum credit was $400 in 1998 and $500 thereafter (in cur-
rent dollars). See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 101, 111
Stat. 788 (1997) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 24(a) (1997)).
83. Butler, supra note 20, at 122.
84. The College Board, Trends in Student Aid, available at http://www.
collegeboard.org/press/costOl/html/TrendsSAO1.pdf (last visited Oct. 26,
2001).
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sumption. It is, for example, difficult to envision industrial and
post-industrial societies without some form of government-spon-
sored (and mandated) old-age pension system.
There are practical and political limits to using generalized
tax cuts to fund social welfare services, however. First, the costs
of some goods and services may be beyond the tax liability of all
but the most affluent. (Refundable tax credits are a form of cash
assistance, and are described in the next section.) The cost of
education is a prime example, but even child care and medical
insurance are unaffordable to many tax-payers-even with a full
refund on taxes paid.
Second, a generalized tax cut (or cash assistance, as we will
see) may not provide a sufficient incentive to consume the partic-
ular good or service involved. Although taxpayers may be able to
afford the good or service, they may lack sufficient interest to
purchase it. (Conversely, it may be difficult to target the tax
relief on those who need financial assistance in order to
purchase the good or service.) There are many examples of
socially harmful underconsumption-for example, the failure to
obtain immunizations.85
Finally, generalized tax cuts rarely satisfy the political pres-
sure to have government address a particular social need. Voters
tend to forget that their taxes were lowered so that they could
afford a particular good or service. They still want targeted aid
(whether in the form of a specific tax deduction or credit or a
grant program) to pay for the service. So, of course, do the advo-
cates, because they want to encourage consumption of the good
or service.
The 1990 expansion of the American Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) aptly demonstrates the phenomena. Conceived,
at least partly, as a response to calls for increased child care fund-
ing, the EITC was expanded to provide over $24 billion over the
succeeding five years" in additional aid to the working poor-so
that they could pay for child care or so that the mother could
stay home. (In 1988, the average EITC credit per family was
$770; in 1991, $1,027; in 1993, $1,225; in 1996, $1,625; in 1999, it
was an estimated $1,593; and, in 2000, and estimated $1,625.)87
But, because the EITC expansion was meant to support both
child care and stay-at-home mothers, it was not called a "child
85. As discussed below, however, top-down approaches are not the only
way to encourage consumption; fee-for-service and voucher systems can work as
well.
86. See Economic Report of the President, PUB. PAPERS 32 (1991).
87. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 2000 GREEN BOOK 813 tbl. 13-
14 (Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter 2000 GREEN BOOK].
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care" program. Hence, at this writing, a scant twelve years later,
political pressure for a "child care" bill has made the passage of
another multi-billion dollar bill extremely likely. This explains
the political attraction of specialized tax deductions and credits,
such as the Child and Dependent Care Credit, which reduces a
family's tax liability in proportion to specified amounts of spend-
ing on child care.
There is, however, substantial question about the actual
impact of such deductions and credits. Unless the financial gain
is very great, they end up changing behavior very little, and are
more accurately considered a cash subsidy to a group of taxpay-
ers who happen to behave in a certain way (or have certain
expenditures). Thus, most economists saw the recently enacted
tax deduction for college or other postsecondary education in
the United States as a subsidy to the upper-middle class (whose
children would likely go to college regardless of the deductibility
of tuition).
In sum, it is not possible to grant sufficient tax relief to help
the least affluent afford high-cost social welfare services (such as
medical care) or to do more than marginally encourage the
purchase of a specific good or service (such as higher educa-
tion). With these two limits in mind, it is nevertheless important
to appreciate that lower taxes could keep important elements of
social welfare private.
B. Cash assistance
If individuals or families do not have the money for a partic-
ular good or service, why not simply give them the money to
purchase it? Cash assistance maximizes consumer choice and
requires no special regulation of providers. More importantly, it
enables individuals and families to choose how to use the govern-
ment aid to make themselves better off. Osborne and Gaebler
write:
Poor women may need training, housing, child care, and
Head Start, but our laws make it far easier for them to get
food stamps and welfare .... Dislocated workers may want
health insurance, but the programs we fund are more apt
to pay for job-search clubs. Systems that put resources in
customers' hands allow them to buy what they want, rather
than what the legislature or city council thinks they need."8
But this, as we will see in a moment, is also the biggest draw-
back of cash assistance.
88. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 2, at 184.
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Besides maximizing recipient choice, cash assistance also
tends to make recipients extremely cost conscious. This is impor-
tant if one objective is to control the program costs. The best
way to give recipients an incentive to shop on the basis of cost as
well as quality is to let them benefit from obtaining a better price
for a good or service. In other words, allow recipients to choose
a less expensive service provider (or spend less than might have
been anticipated on the service)-and let them use the differ-
ence in cost (the amount saved) for other purposes. Again, this
tends to lower individual expenditures, total expenditures, and
also the price of goods and services purchased.
The case for non-cash aid-to encourage consumption or
assure "quality"-is much weaker when there are wildly different
prices for essentially the same good or service, and individual
recipients are much better positioned to obtain the lower-priced
one than is the government. This is apparently the basis for the
decision of a number of American states to allow parents to "cash
out" their child care assistance, as described below.
The most familiar form of cash assistance is aid to the poor.
In the United States, for example, as described above, it takes two
major forms: (1) a refundable tax credit (EITC), in 1999,
amounting to a projected amount of almost $31 billion and aver-
aging about $1,600 per household,89 and (2) "welfare" grants, in
the same year amounting to about $11.7 billion and averaging
about $4,428 a year per family.9 °
However, both universal old-age and disability payments are
also forms of cash assistance. After all, their purpose could also
be accomplished through in-kind services provided by public and
private agencies. The United States makes a sharp distinction
between cash assistance for the poor and for the elderly and dis-
abled: It gives the poor a higher proportion of their aid in the
form of vouchers (food stamps) and in-kind services (housing)
than it does to the elderly and disabled. Thus, while in 1999 the
average cash grant to a family on welfare with no income was
$4,428 a year,9 the average Social Security payment for a retired
worker and aged spouse was $16,906 a year.
92
89. See 2000 GREEN BOOK, supra note 88, at 813 tbl. 13-14.
90. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, RES. AND EVALUATION, ADMINISTRATION FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., TEMPORARY AID FOR
NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM, THIRD ANN. REP. 37, 108-09 (2000). Total TANF
spending, however, was over $22 billion and also includes TANF expenditures
on work activities, childcare and various other services.
91. See id. at 108-09.
92. See 2000 GREEN BOOK, supra note 87, at 156.
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First, giving large amounts of aid to the poor in the form of
cash can discourage work and saving-as well as being politically
unacceptable. Providing a cash grant equal to the costs of food,
housing and medical care, not to mention education, would add
about $8,500 to each family's welfare payment.93 And its total
grant (almost $13,000) would be higher than the wages of over
20% of all workers with earnings and over 8% of full-time full-
year workers with earnings.94
Even when cash assistance is phased out based on income,
the resultant marginal tax rates create a palpable disincentive to
work. Using non-cash forms of assistance mitigates these
problems because it reduces the apparent size of the grant. Also,
because non-cash aid can only be used for certain, delimited pur-
poses, recipients still have an incentive to work (although it is
reduced) in order to obtain money with which to purchase other
things."5 In addition, the nature of the in-kind aid, itself, may be
93. The cost of food for a three-person family was calculated by sub-
tracting the maximum TANF benefit for a three-person family from the maxi-
mum combined TANF and Food Stamp benefit for a three-person family. See
2000 GREEN BOOK, supra note 88, at 388, 390. According to HUD rules, eligible
tenants for local public housing are required to pay the higher of (a) 30% of
counted income (various deductions are made in determining countable
income, e.g., $40 per month per dependent) or (b) 10% of gross income toward
the rental rate. See CONG. RES. SERVICE, CASH AND NONCASH BENEFITS FOR PER-
SON WITH LIMITED INCOME: ELIGIBILITY RULES, RECIPIENT AND EXPENDITURE
DATA, FY 1996-1998 116-17 (Comm. Print 1999). Therefore, the cost of a
housing subsidy for a three-person family was calculated as the average fair-
market rate (FMR) for two bedroom housing less the average payment toward
rent for a family of three, multiplied by the proportion of TANF families in
public housing, receiving HUD rent subsidy or other rent subsidy. See Universal
Living Wage 2000, Fiscal Year 2001 Final Fair Market Rents for Existing Housing, at
http://www.universallivingwage.org/states-fmrtables/pennfmr2001.htm; 2000
GREEN BOOK, supra note 88, at 384 tbl. 7-7; [see ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, AID TO FAMILIES WITH
DEPENDENT CHILDREN: CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF
AFDC RECIPIENTS, FY 1996 4 table 4 (YEAR). The cost of medical care was
calculated as the sum of per capita Medicaid payments for two children and
one adult. See 2000 GREEN BOOK, supra note 87, at 915 tbl. 15-16.
94. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P60-209, MONEY
INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1999 40, 46, 49 (2000).
95. See Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, A Positive Theory of the In-
Kind Transfers and the Negative Income Tax, in POLITICAL ECONOMY at 70 (Allan
H. Meltzer ed.) ("When choosing the type of redistribution he prefers, the deci-
sive voter reasons as follows: If I allow each recipient to choose the bundle of
goods and services that maximize his utility, those below some level of income
will decide not to work. By giving income in kind, I can encourage people who
are net beneficiaries of the tax-transfer system to make different labor-leisure
choices. For example, if I allow the government to distribute only one good,
people with relatively low productivity will find that all of their disposable
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sufficiently stigmatizing to discourage its use, and therefore
dependency. (Recently, some economists have estimated that
cash aid to the elderly discourages savings, 96 but, so far, their
work has had little impact on policy.)
The second reason for not giving more cash assistance to the
poor (or non-poor for that matter) is that they are not trusted to
spend the cash aid "wisely," that is, on the things government
wants them to purchase. This concern is not just about recipi-
ents choosing gin (or a stereo) over food, for example; it is also
about their choosing clothes over food, or education over health
care, or transportation over housing, and so forth-and vice
versa.
9 7
Thus, for example, experts in the nutrition field (and vot-
ers) tend to support using food stamps (which are vouchers)
instead of cash because, even though food purchases can be
made in the open market with minimal supervision of the con-
sumer, the object of policy is to encourage food consumption.
Other programs seek to encourage the "consumption" of health
care or housing. The well-known American economist Lester
Thurow refers to this as government supplantation of "consumer
sovereignty," although one of the "mildest and least coercive"
forms:
Governments have a whole range of public policies that
can be used to supplement or supplant consumer sover-
eignty, but one of the mildest and least coercive of these is
the public provision of goods and services in kind. Such
in-kind aid can be used to influence individuals to make
income is in one consumption good; they are surfeited with the good that the
government offers and have none of the other good(s). Since they cannot
resell the good they receive, they will be willing to trade leisure for income to
purchase the good(s) they do not have. By working they trade leisure, valued at
the marginal product of labor, for consumption of a good that has relatively
high marginal utility. They will continue to trade leisure for consumption of
the good they purchase until they reach a constrained optimum.").
96. Critics of the U.S. Social Security program, for example, contend that
it decreases savings and, as a result, capital investment and economic growth.
Instead of saving and investing money for their retirement, workers rely on the
government-through a payroll tax-to take care of them in their old age. See
Martin Feldstein, Privatizing Social Security: The $10 Trillion Opportunity, THE
CATO PROJECT ON SOCL SECURITY PRWVATIZATION (Cato. Inst., Washington,
D.C.), Jan. 31, 1997, at 6 ("Social Security privatization would increase the eco-
nomic well-being of future generations by an amount equal to five percent of
GDP each year as long as the system lasts. Although the transition to a funded
system would involve economic as well as political costs, the net present value of
the gain would be enormous-as much as $10-20 trillion.").
97. See Eugene Steuerle, Uses of the Negative Income Tax Framework, 12
Focus 30-32 (1990).
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those decisions that society thinks they would be making if
they were "competent."98
Sometimes, the purpose of the assistance is to force a
change in the behavior of recipients. Then recipient choice is
irrelevant, if not at counterpurpose. 9' And, indeed, such argu-
ments are made by some child care experts:
Offering parents their choice of any legal provider, how-
ever, may conflict with the goal of improving the quality of
child care for low-income families. Specialists in child
development define quality in terms of provider-child
interactions, provider-child ratios, group sizes, and train-
ing. Parents, however, may value features other than those
valued by specialists, such as the provider's location, and
are often willing to make trade-offs among these features.
Low-income parents also face budgetary constraints and
other pressures that may make them less likely than rela-
tively higher-income parents to emphasize "quality" in
their search for child care. Even if quality is a priority,
information on the quality of particular child care options
is difficult to obtain, and parents may not have the time to
research, compare, and finally select providers.1 00
This, then, is the second limitation to using cash assistance.
While it might be possible to "trust" the poor to make decisions
about how much to spend on their own food and housing, giving
them the same power over health care and their children's edu-
cation (by giving them cash equal to the full value of their medi-
cal insurance, about $4,000 per family, and of public education,
as much as $9,000 per child) would create too large a danger of
underconsumption, to put it tactfully. Many people would see
this as a big problem because they want the poor to "benefit"
from the program as intended by the government. Others might
98. Lester C. Thurow, Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers?, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
190, 193 (1974).
99. Here is an example given by Thurow:
If public child care is designed to allow each mother an equal oppor-
tunity to go to work (regardless of her husband's income), then
vouchered private child care centers may be the appropriate answer.
If child care is also desired as a method of altering values and charac-
teristics (enrichment is our current euphemism), then public in-kind
provision of child care is appropriate. Since society wants to change
the values that the mothers would inculcate if they were at home, it
obviously cannot allow the mothers to pick the private child care cen-
ters that the public funds are to be used to support. In either case,
however, restricted transfers dominate cash.).
See id. at 195.
100. See Ross & Kerachsky, supra note 35, at 40.
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be more willing to see people spend less on health care, espe-
cially if the unused money was used for other productive
purposes.
Actually, it is difficult to control the spending of recipients,
even with vouchers or other in-kind programs. Unless the bene-
fit exceeds what the recipient would have spent in the absence of
aid, the benefit is simply a form of income assistance since the
recipient is free to substitute the aid for prior expenditures. This
means that in-kind benefits are more accurately viewed as
increasing the marginal propensity to consume a good or service.
(This is discussed in greater detail in the section on vouchers.)
In order to regulate recipient spending decisions, the Amer-
ican welfare system allows a hybrid between cash and vouchers:
"grant diversion." Under this procedure, an individual's cash
grant is paid directly to a service provider (such as a residential
drug treatment program), an employer (to supplement earn-
ings), or a landlord (when rent repeatedly goes unpaid). Since
the diversion is for designated purposes, the payment, although
formally denominated in dollars, is more like a voucher-
because the recipient must consume the particular good or ser-
vice but gets to choose the provider. As efforts to reshape the
behaviors of public aid recipients grow, greater use of this type of
mechanism is probable.
C. Reimbursed fee-for-services
Most widely used in health care, reimbursed fee-for-service
systems allow recipients to choose their providers (whose fee for
the particular good or service is then paid by the government or
other third party, either directly to the provider or indirectly by
reimbursing the recipient's expenditures). Such systems
encourage consumption of the particular good or service
because the recipient usually does not pay for it, and cannot use
the aid for another purpose.
In the United States, the major reimbursed fee-for-service
programs are Medicare and Medicaid. In 1998, Medicare pro-
vided $222 billion in benefits to 38.4 million individuals, with an
annual per capita cost of $5,773. Medicaid expenditures were
$187 billion in benefits to 40.6 million individuals, with an
annual per capita cost of $4,609.1°1
An unappreciated benefit of fee-for-service systems is that
they are almost pure, recipient-directed systems. They maximize
101. See 2000 GREEN BOOK, supra note 87, at 106-07, This. 15-13, 15-14.
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recipient choice, and minimize top-down, government control
(within the context of directed consumption, of course).
This is changing, however. In the United States and many
other OECD countries, the costs of fee-for-service health care
programs are escalating rapidly. As a result, various top-down
efforts are being made to control costs. In the United States,
there is now massive price regulation through the "Diagnostic
Related Groups" (DRG) system that pays providers a predeter-
mined amount per procedure or medical condition. The DRG
system encourages providers to cut costs, since they get to keep
any "profit." In addition, almost all low-income families in the
American Medicaid program are now required to be in health
maintenance organizations, which are often subject to a cap or
other control on total expenditures. Many national programs
have adopted other ways to restrain costs, such as limiting the
total income of physicians or the number of approved service
providers (if the number of approved providers is small enough
to restrict access).
0 2
Taken together, these cost controls appear to have stemmed
the inflation of health care costs. But many observers believe
that they are only temporary fixes. For example, the incentives
under the American DRG system are not as great as they could
be because the price schedule reflects average costs, rather than
the lowest costs. In any event, per recipient health care costs,
and therefore total costs, continue to rise as patients receive
more medical services and technological advances make health
care more expensive.
Not only do these efforts to control costs tend to erode
recipient choice, they also fail to use what might be the most
effective constraint on costs: cost-conscious recipients/consum-
ers. In almost all developed countries, the current approach is
for government to pay the full amount of the recipient's medical
costs. But this gives recipients no incentive to economize-by
either pressing for lower costs or seeking fewer medical
procedures.
If recipients were simply given cash, of course, they would
become cost conscious because they would personally benefit
from obtaining a better price for a good or service. But, as we
have seen, there are many program areas where it may not be
advisable to provide cash aid. The large amount of cash that
102. The recent movement toward managed care may make the Ameri-
can Medicaid program more like a voucher system, because recipients, in effect,
will have a certificate to select one particular provider of the full range of medi-
cal care.
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would have to be provided to cover the purchase of some goods
or services might create an unwanted work disincentive or other
behavioral effect, and recipients might not even spend the
money as intended. Or, we may wish to encourage recipient con-
sumption of the good or service beyond what recipients might
choose on their own.
Nevertheless, it is possible to introduce cost consciousness
into a fee-for-service system-through recipient copayments.
Copayments can constrain costs or ration services by making
individuals feel at least some of the financial costs of their deci-
sions. (As we will see, copayments can also be an important
aspect of voucher systems.)
In 1974, the RAND Corporation began a long-term study of
the impact of copayments, what the study called "cost-sharing,"
on the utilization of health services. In the RAND Health Insur-
ance Experiment, individuals were randomly assigned to four
experimental health insurance plans with varying levels of cost-
sharing: 0% copayment (free care), 25% copayment, 50% copay-
ment, and 95% copayment. (The latter three had a $1,000 a year
cap on recipient copayments.) The RAND researchers con-
cluded that "use of medical services responds unequivocally to
changes in the amount paid out of pocket," with per capita
health care expenditures on the free plan "45% higher than
those on the plan with a 95% coinsurance rate." (Spending rates
on the 25 and 50% coinsurance plans were also lower, but not as
much.)'03
Thus, copayment strategies are most attractive when there is
a need to encourage recipients to set priorities among what
would otherwise be discretionary purchases. However, the unam-
biguous purpose of the copayment is to reduce consumption of
the particular good or service. But what if the good or service is
deemed important to the individual's or society's well-being? In
the Health Insurance Experiment, for example, the researchers
found that "the reduced service use under cost-sharing plans had
little or no net adverse effect on health for the average person.
Indeed, restricted activity days fell with more cost sharing."104
Some groups, though, mainly the chronically sick poor, did suf-
fer. "The poor who began the Experiment with elevated blood
pressure had their blood pressure lowered more on the free care
plan than on the cost-sharing plans. The effect on predicted
103. SeeJOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, FREE
FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 40, 79
(1993).
104. Id. at 40, 79, 339.
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mortality rates-a fall of about 10 percent-was substantial for
this group."15
It is important to understand the nature of the choice
reflected in this behavior of the sick poor. It is not that they
chose to die, nor that they could not meet the co-payment with-
out starving. No, they preferred to have the immediate cash as
opposed to having a 10% lower risk of a future heart attack. One
need not disapprove of the choice to appreciate society's stake in
the outcome.
In any event, if copayments are sizable enough, they can
make recipients price conscious. That is, recipients who are pay-
ing a meaningful amount toward something's cost will be more
sensitive to its price-and more likely to bargain for a lower
price, shop for a less expensive version, reduce consumption of it
or forego it entirely. Many recipients, of course, cannot afford a
large copayment. That is why copayments are often set on a slid-
ing scale, and some very poor recipients may be entirely excused
from making a copayment. But, as mentioned above, not all con-
sumers need be savvy or cost conscious for market forces to work.
Copayments are sometimes large enough to help pay for a
service. Thus, in child care, sliding-scale payments often require
parents to pay as much as half of the cost of their children's care,
and some pay more (up to the full cost). In such cases, the
copayment goes beyond being a device to sensitize recipients to
costs and becomes an integral element of program funding.
As the foregoing suggests, there are many similarities
between reimbursed fee-for-service systems and vouchers. The
major difference is that, because fee-for-service systems reim-
burse providers for the particular goods or services rendered,
they are more appropriate in program areas in which the types
and amounts of services (and hence, costs) vary over time or
between accounting periods. When there is no such variation,
then vouchers are preferable because they involve much less
paperwork and hence, lower overhead expenses.
This explains the growing interest in vouchers for the Amer-
ican Medicaid and Medicare programs. As more recipients are
105. Id. at 339.
In addition, free care marginally improved both near and far cor-
rected vision . . . and increased the likelihood that a decayed tooth
would be filled-an effect found disproportionately among the less
well educated. Health of gums was marginally better for those with
free care. And serious symptoms were less prevalent on the free plan,
especially for those who began the Experiment poor and with serious
symptoms. Finally, there appeared to be a beneficial effect on anemia
for children. Id.
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enrolled in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that have




Vouchers are a form of scrip given to designated recipients,
usually by government, that recipients use to pay providers for a
specified good or service.10 7 Vouchers normally contain an
express limitation on the costs or services that are reimbursable.
(The scrip, which can be in the form of a coupon, certificate, a
credit card-like device, or even a simple bookkeeping entry, is
then submitted by the provider to the government or other
funder for reimbursement.)
Vouchers are meant to provide assistance in obtaining a par-
ticular good or service: housing vouchers cannot be used to
obtain clothing; educational vouchers cannot be used for food;
and so on. In the United States, the largest program to use a
voucher is the Food Stamp Program. In 2000, food stamps were
provided to 17.2 million people, or one in sixteen Americans, at
a cost of $19.1 billion. 108 The average monthly value of food
stamps per household was $158, with a maximum of about $426
per month for an average household of four. °9 Actually, food
stamps have many attributes of a cash grant: Clients are able to
use them to purchase any number of different food items from a
large array of merchants, so that there is relatively wide con-
sumer choice and corresponding competition among providers.
As described above, the major difference between reim-
bursed fee-for-service systems and vouchers is that the former can
vary in value depending on the services provided in the particu-
lar accounting periods while vouchers are usually for a specified
106. See, e.g.,JOHN HOOD, SOLVING THE MEDICAID PuzzLE: STRATEGIES FOR
STATE ENTITLEMENT REFORM 28 (1997).
107. Government provided membership in a health maintenance organi-
zation (HMO) or preferred provider organization (PPO) is often viewed as the
equivalent of a voucher, if the individual can choose among the HMOs or
PPOs.
108. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Services, National Level
Annual Summary: Participation and Costs, 1969-2000, available at http://www.fns.
usda.gov/fsp/Default.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2001). The state share of
administrative expenses was calculated based on the historical ration of federal-
to-state administrative expenses.
109. Karen Cunnyngham & Lisa Fowler for U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
Food and Nutrition Service, Office of Analysis, Nutrition, and Evaluation, Char-
acteristics of Food Stamp Households: Fiscal Year 2000 (Advance Report), June 2001,
available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/Published/FSP/FILES/Par-
ticipation/2000advrpt.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
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value or service. Thus, because vouchers involve less paperwork,
they are a preferred market mechanism when the amount of the
subsidy does not vary from accounting period to accounting
period (either because the cost of the service, such as housing, is
constant or because the benefit is capped, as in most educational
vouchers). This very inflexibility, it should be noted, means that
vouchers are an easy way to control or cap costs, by limiting their
value or number. "On the other hand, if vouchers can be used as
partial payment, or if voucher prices are set too high, they may
exert an inflationary impact on service prices, particularly where
there are constraints on supply, or where voucher holders will
constitute a large proportion of the market."" °
As mentioned above, vouchers are being suggested as a
means of slowing spiraling health care costs, for example. Much
of government-provided health care is under reimbursed or
third-party, fee-for-service regimes-whose costs, as we have seen,
are difficult to control without appreciable copayments. The
idea is to give a voucher of fixed value that would enable recipi-
ents to choose their own health maintenance organizations
(HMO), which in turn would apply cost controls because their
reimbursement would be capped.
The ability of vouchers to influence what recipients actually
consume, however, is limited by the possibility of substitution.
For vouchers (and fee-for-service systems, as well) free up other
household resources that would have been spent on the goods
and services provided by the voucher. As Rebecca Blank of the
U.S. President's Council of Economic Advisers observes in rela-
tion to food stamps, "A family that replaces food dollars with
Food Stamp coupons will have more dollars to spend elsewhere,
which may improve their ability to find adequate housing or to
maintain a car."''
This raises the question of whether a particular voucher
encourages consumption of the particular good or service-or is
just a form of income support. The American Food Stamp Pro-
gram demonstrates the blurred lines between vouchers and cash
support. According to most research studies, food stamps result
in only modest increases in food consumption (about 30 cents
on the dollar)1" 2 and there is now a thriving black market for
them. If recipients are willing to accept a discount off their face
110. Stoesz, supra note 25, at 7.
111. REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING
POVERTY 162 (1997).
112. See PETER H. Rossi, FEEDING THE POOR: ASSESSING FEDERAL FOOD AID
4 (1998).
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value (typically from 20 to 50%), most are able to trade their
stamps for cash, thereby escaping the need to spend the entire
value of their coupons on food stuffs.
Thus, vouchers may not increase consumption if their value
is less than what the recipient would otherwise spend on the
same good or service (with a corresponding increase in income)
or if the recipient can sell all or part of the voucher in a secon-
dary or "black" market. Although efforts have been made to
police the transfer or resale of vouchers, it is hard to prevent the
creation of a black market-unless the nature of the voucher
makes it difficult to sell. The best examples of vouchers that are
difficult to transfer are probably vouchers for housing and for
center-based child care, since they require the long-term identifi-
cation of the recipient to providers who have little interest in
cheating.
Deciding to adopt a voucher system for a particular program
area requires a prediction of the degree to which the vouchers
will be sold or traded followed by a judgment about whether the
predicted level of diversion is acceptable. (Fee-for-service sys-
tems are somewhat less likely to encounter the same level of
fraud because they tend to require greater proof of the identity
of the recipient.)
The nature of the market for the particular good or service,
once again, should have an impact on the decision. A number of
American states allow parents to "cash out" their child care
vouchers for the very reason that the cost of child care can vary
widely depending on the type of care the parent selects-and on
whether the parent chooses a friend or relative who will charge
less than the "market" rate.
Vouchers can take many forms. The following program-
matic options are discussed in terms of vouchers but much of the
discussion is equally applicable to reimbursed fee-for-service sys-
tems. (See Box 5).
Box 5
VOUCHER OPTIONS
* Form of scrip (coupons, certificate, or bookkeeping entry
" Limitations on the goods or services obtainable
* Providers designated (licensed, registered, or otherwise restricted)
" Amount (covers full cost of good/service or sliding-scale copayment
based on income or other determinant of need)
" Refundable (in whole or in part)
" Number (offered to all who meet specific eligibility criteria, or
rationed)
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Form of scrip? Vouchers can take the form of coupons, certifi-
cates or even simple bookkeeping entries. Coupons are the most
cash-like of vouchers. They are often used when there will be
multiple purchases from multiple providers. The United States
has adopted a credit card-like device, called "Electronic Benefit
Transfer" (EBT), to disburse its food stamp benefits. Bookkeep-
ing entries are possible when there are a small number of provid-
ers and they have an ongoing relationship with the funder.
Limitations on the goods or services obtainable? Most vouchers
place some limitation on the particular goods or services that can
be purchased with them. In some programs, the limitation is rel-
atively minor, as in the American Food Stamp program, which
places virtually no limits on the specific forms of foods that can
be purchased. (Excluded, for example, are alcohol, tobacco,
and hot foods intended for immediate consumption.) In other
programs, the limits are more substantial. Thus, the American
Special Supplemental Nutritional Program for Women, Infants
and Children (WIC) provides vouchers that can be used only for
specific food items, such as milk, cheese, infant formula, cereals,
and fruit or vegetable juices. A day care voucher, for example,
might encompass all types of day care to be provided for all par-
ents needing the service or, at the opposite extreme, might be
for a single type of day care to be made available to a specified
low-income population.
Designated providers? Some vouchers may be used with any
provider of the specified goods or services, but most are limited
to providers that are licensed, registered, or meet some other cri-
teria. In the United States, for example, food stamps can be used
only at approved grocery stores; other vouchers, such as'those for
housing or education, usually can be used only with designated
providers. On this issue, child care vouchers have gone through
something of a transformation, from being useable only with
licensed providers to now being technically useable, in most
American jurisdictions, with anyone the parent chooses." 3 This
ability to designate or limit service providers under a voucher sys-
tem increases the tendency to impose government standards on
the service or program. After all, with the power to approve ser-
vice providers goes the increased responsibility to assure that the
voucher is not misused.
113. Administrative and practical constraints, however, often limit the
number of providers willing to accept child care vouchers. See Douglas J.
Besharov & Nazanin Samari, Child Care after Welfare Reform, in THE NEW WORLD
OF WELFAuu 467-68 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001).
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Amount? A voucher can cover the full cost of the goods or
services involved,"' a set percentage of the cost (or a specific
dollar amount), or a sliding-scale copayment based on income or
some other determinant of need. Besides rationing aid, a partial
voucher can instill cost consciousness. A voucher that covers the
full cost of the service, on the other hand, gives recipients no
incentive to limit expenditures or shop for a lower price. To the
extent that we desire them to do so in a particular program area,
a copayment is appropriate (as discussed in the section on fee-
for-service programs). Such copayments usually vary by the
recipient's income, and they can be large enough to help pay for
the service (although a sliding scale can create a hefty marginal
tax rate for low-wage workers).
Refundable? For a required copayment to encourage cost
consciousness, it must be large enough to "bite." What about
those recipients who cannot afford to make a copayment of any
meaningful size? Much talked about, but apparently little used,
would be a refundable voucher. Recipients who can pocket the
difference between a lower-cost provider and the dollar value of
the voucher have a strong incentive to be cost conscious. This is
how the "Section 8" housing voucher worked in the United States
until 1998, when the "shopping incentive" credit was eliminated
in Title V of the FY 1999 HUD Appropriations Act."' Under
that credit, "If a household can find an acceptable unit renting
for less than [the amount of the voucher], it can keep the differ-
ence."1 1 6 In essence, refundability is a reality when there is (or
114. There may be a requirement that the provider accept the voucher as
full payment for the good or service.
115. See Dep't of Housing and Urb. Dev., Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998, 64 Fed. Reg. 8193. For a general discussion of the
.shopping incentive," see Citizens' Housing and Planning Association, Housing
Guidebook, 1999, available at http://www.chapa.orglhsggdbkadobe/RentalAssistance.
PDF (last visited Oct. 4, 2001) ("The voucher program . . . [gives] tenants a
fixed subsidy equal to the difference between 30% of their income and a pay-
ment standard based on the FMR. HUD allows PHAs to set the payment stan-
dard but it must be between 80% and 100% of the FMR. Voucher holders are
generally permitted to lease units with gross rents in excess of the FMR, but
because their subsidy amount is fixed, households that lease higher cost units
must bear the entire extra cost. On the other hand, the fixed subsidy meant
households leasing a unit that costs less than the payment standard end up
paying less than 30% of their income for housing (Congress began phasing out
this feature-called a "shopping incentive"-in FY '99).").
116. John C. Weicher, The Voucher/Production Debate, in BUILDING FOUNDA-
TIONS: HOUSING AND FEDERAL POLIcY 266 (Denise DiPasquale & Langley C.
Keyes eds., 1990); Telephone Interview with John C. Weicher, Senior Fellow,
Hudson Inst. (Apr. 14, 1998) ("Actual program outcomes show that about 24%
of voucher recipients rent units for less than 95% of the Fair Market Rent. 19%
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can be) a black market for the vouchers, such as with the Ameri-
can Food Stamp Program. And, it can also develop in those sys-
tems, such as child care and housing, in which the recipient and
the provider can agree to what is essentially a kick back, legal or
otherwise.
Actually, the idea of refundability is not that radical. For
many years, the United States government has offered a refund-
able education voucher to service members and veterans."
1 7
Authorized by what is commonly referred to as the GI Bill and
administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs, the federal
government currently provides $672 per month to service mem-
bers and veterans pursuing education or vocational training. 18
(Entitlement is based on months of service-to receive thirty-six
months of benefits (four academic years), participants must com-
plete three years of continuous active duty (or two years if they
signed up for less than three years), or if discharged for the Con-
venience of the Government, they must have completed twenty
months (if they signed up for less than three years) or thirty
months (if they signed up for three years or more)).
The voucher is for tuition and fees, and participants receive
$672 per month regardless of whether they choose to attend a
private or public college or university, or a vocational training
program. The amount is adjusted depending on hours in
school-full-time students receive $672, half-time students
receive half that amount. If the student attends an institution for
which tuition is less than $672 per month, students can keep the
difference and attribute it to living expenses.
Voter resistance to refundable vouchers would, nevertheless,
probably be substantial. In an innovative response, John Hood
rent units for 95% to 100% of the FMR. The others pay more than the FMR,
paying the difference out of their own pocket. That's another distinctive fea-
ture of the voucher: They can do that.").
117. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BENNETT, WHEN DREAMS CAME TRUE: THE GI
BILL AND THE MAING OF MODERN AMERICA (1996). To receive the voucher,
eligible service members and veterans must choose an institution and certify
their enrollment. Students can receive their benefits either by a check that is
issued to them directly, or they can request that the benefit be deposited
directly into their checking or savings account. For a general description of the
Montgomery GI Bill, see U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS BENEFITS
ADMIN., 2001, THE MONTGOMERY GI BILL-ACTIVrE DUTY: SUMMARY OF THE EDUCA-
TIONAL BENEFITS UNDER THE MONTGOMERY GI BILL-ACTIVE DUTY EDUCATIONAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CHAPrER 30 OF TITLE 38 U.S. CODE, available at http://
www.gibill.va.gov/education/c3Opam.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2001).
118. See U.S. DEPT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN. 2001.
CHAPTER 30 INCREASED EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE ALLOWANCE, available at http://
www.gibill.va.gov/education/News/ch3ORateslOOlOl.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2001).
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of the Reason Public Policy Institute has proposed that recipients
"have the option of depositing any part of the [medical] voucher
not spent on medical insurance or care not only into medical
savings accounts but also in educational savings accounts, from
which they could make withdrawals for theirs or their children's
education, or individual development accounts, from which they
could make withdrawals for housing, transportation, or other
approved expenditures to help get themselves off public assis-
tance."119 The idea is particularly apt for medical vouchers, since
they would be so large, and the possible price reductions
through competition so great. But this concept of modified
refundability could be applied to other areas as well, such as food
stamps.
Number? Limited funding often requires a trade-off between
universal but small vouchers and large but targeted (or rationed)
vouchers. Thus, the other way that vouchers can be used to limit
costs is by limiting the number of vouchers issued.
CONCLUSION
There are no simple prescriptions for deciding when top-
down or bottom-up systems are better and, if a bottom-up system
is selected, which market mechanism should be used. The
answers will necessarily vary from program area to program area,
based on existing service structures, potential markets, and policy
preferences. [[National] ]Local attitudes are also important.
What might be accepted in one [ [country] ] jurisdiction might be
disdained in another. Hence, there is no single, correct answer
as to whether there should be a market in social welfare services
or how it should be structured. Rather, policy makers should
appreciate the general advantages (but also disadvantages) of
bottom-up, recipient-directed systems, and the need to make
choices based on local conditions.
Nevertheless, it is possible to outline the general policy con-
siderations involved. (See Box 6) Ordinarily, recipient-directed
systems are preferable to top-down ones unless it appears that a
true market will not develop, the recipients will not be wise con-
sumers, or that the uncertainties of the market may compromise
other important considerations in relation to the particular good
or service.1 20 Tax relief or cash assistance is preferable to govern-
119. JOHN HOOD, SOLVING THE MEDICAID PUZZLE, STRATEGIES FOR STATE
ENTITLEMENT REFORM 29 (1997).
120. For example, having schools go "out of business" in the middle of
the school year may be a consideration against a pure voucher system for ele-
mentary and secondary education.
MARKETPLACE FOR SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES
ment fee-for-service or voucher systems because cash maximizes
individual choice about how to improve their standard of living.
But cash may not be appropriate (1) when large amounts are
involved (because of possible work disincentives and other
behavioral effects) or (2) when added consumption of the partic-
ular good or service is desired and under-consumption is other-
wise likely. Fee-for-service systems are preferable to vouchers
when the amount of the subsidy is likely to vary from period to
period. And vouchers may be inappropriate when there are
widely different prices for essentially the same good or service,
and individual recipients are much better positioned to obtain
the lower-priced one than is the government. Finally, in both
fee-for-service and voucher systems, copayment arrangements




* Would a tax reduction allow many people to afford the good or service
without government aid?
* Would cash assistance to help people purchase the good or service
create too large a work disincentive or other behavioral effects, without
assuring that recipients would spend the money as intended?
" Should recipients be encouraged to consume the good or service? If so,
to what degree?
" Will recipients tend to substitute non-cash benefits for expenditures
they would ordinarily make, thus undermining the purpose of targeted
assistance?
" If vouchers are used, will a secondary or black market for the voucher
be likely to develop?
* Will the amount of aid provided vary so that a voucher for a set
amount of assistance would be inappropriate, and a more flexible fee-
for-service system needed?
" Should recipients be encouraged to be cost conscious? If so, to what
degree?
" Will the phaseout of non-cash benefits (or a sliding-scale copayment)
create marginal tax rates that discourage work or savings?
" Are recipients able to buy the same or equivalent services at sharply
different prices?
One final point: There is no mystery about creating a system
of bottom-up funding. In fact, there are examples in most devel-
oped countries throughout social welfare programming. In the
developed world, the obstacles to developing recipient-directed
systems are less conceptual than political-because they often
involve the defunding of deeply entrenched interests. That, as
much as developing a wise and workable system, is the challenge.
Most middle-income countries do not yet have the extensive
network of top-down programs of more affluent countries. So,
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there is one final lesson from the experience of more developed
countries: If a recipient-directed system of bottom-up social welfare fund-
ing is desired, establish it before service providers become programmati-
cally and politically established within a tap-down regime.
Although market-based systems are most easily installed
within pre-existing private service systems, middle-income coun-
tries should not reject them simply because there are few private
providers of a particular service. Through sequential and orderly
implementation, such providers will appear.
